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Understanding Culture and Language
Mario R.J. Corbin
Department of Humanities
Institute of Technology Blanchardstown
“...looking across at our primate relatives learning local traditions, using tools, and
manipulating symbols, we can no longer say comfortably that ‘culture’ is the
heritage of learned symbolic behaviour that makes humans human.” R. Keesing
(1974: 73)

1. Expanding Our Understanding of Culture
A consequence of human evolution that has had the most profound impact on human
nature and human society was the emergence of culture. A term credited uniquely to
humans, however over the course of the last century new developments in animal
behaviour have been introduced, indicating perhaps that our understanding of culture is
too limited, despite there being a vast amount of theoretical approaches to culture.
Before we can further attempt to understand whether or not culture can be attributed to
animals, we must first closely examine the concept of culture from a human
perspective, including a detailed analysis of the role which language plays in
maintaining culture. It could be argued that if animals were attributed with the ability
to sustain culture, the very notion alone would bring into question humanity’s, albeit
arrogant view, that as a species we are more than an animal. The term human in itself
purposefully separates us from all other living creatures on this planet. An aspect that
has affected the world over ecologically as in every known part of the world where
humans reside, the environment during the last century alone has suffered
consequences of humanity’s so-called ‘superiority’. It serves to segregate ‘the other’; in
this case being any other species than human whilst also segregating humanity from an
innate connection with this world, that is humanity has lost touch with its symbiotic
relationship with earth. Thus, the debate over whether or not culture solely exists
amongst humanity is in itself arguable as it is through various forms of culture, albeit
some more complex than others, that all species can adapt and survive in any given
eco-system and or environment.
Emily Schultz & Robert Lavenda (1995) argue that culture makes us unique as a
species as we are more dependent than any other species on learning for survival
because we have no instincts that automatically protect us and find us food and shelter.
They also argue that we have come to use our complex intelligence in order to learn
from other members of society what we need to know to survive, otherwise known as
enculturation. This teaching and learning process is a primary focus of childhood,
which is longer for humans than for any other species.i Within the anthropological
perspective, it is culture; according to Schultz & Lavenda that is central to not only
understanding why humans are the way they are but also why as a species we behave
the way that we do. Thus, a human behaves the way he or she does because of the
process of enculturation and not as a result of his or her being genetically programmed
to be a certain way. It is fair to insinuate that most anthropologists reject explanations
of human behaviour that force them to choose between biology and culture as the
cause. Rather, anthropologists prefer to emphasize that human beings are biocultural
organisms. As Schultz and Lavenda state:
“Our genetically guided biological makeup, including our brain, nervous system, and
anatomy, makes us capable of creating and using culture. Without these biological
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endowments, human culture as we know it would not exist. At the same time, our
survival as biological organisms depends upon learned cultural traditions that help us
find food, shelter, and mates, and that teach us how to rear our offspring. This is
because our biological endowment, rich as it is, does not provide us with instincts that
would take care of these survival needs. Human biology makes culture possible;
human culture makes human biological survival possible. (1995: 5)

Does human biology make culture possible? Is it truly a uniquely human attribute or
are there different ways of life that transcend humanity all together, that in their own
right are working social structures not unlike the concept of culture itself? It is
undoubtedly true that human culture makes human biological survival possible for the
most part, but as we have seen through the history of human evolution, food, shelter
and clothing did not always consist of mini malls, McDonald’s and Ralph Lauren shirts
and Calvin Klein jeans. Indeed, such attributes to human survival are still only unique
to certain parts of the globe, particularly western cultures. Consequently, these notions
of the superiority of the human condition predominate many of the discussions
revolving around the concept of culture, often treating our ability to survive as not
simply the only way a human being can live and breathe on this spaceship called earth,
but as well as the more favorable, civilized way of life. Thus, excluding all other nonhuman mammals from the concept of culture and treating them as savages in our midst,
allowing to live or let die, depending on the particular needs of the culture which
happens to be overlapping with earth’s other inhabitants is inherently savage in itself of
our species. However, before we can continue to explore this concept, which will be
referred to as animal culture for argument’s sake, let us first turn to the different
concepts and attributes of culture that have been discussed by other anthropological and
sociological minds.
According to Roger M. Keesing (1974) applying an evolutionary model of natural
selection to cultural constriction in biological foundations has led anthropologists to ask
with increasing sophistication how human communities develop particular cultural
patterns. How have cultures developed and what forces shape them? How are cultures
learned? How do shared symbolic systems transcend individual thought words? How
different and unique are cultures really? Do universal patterns underlie diversity? How
is cultural description to be possible?ii These are but some of the questions being
sought when trying to understand and answer the increasingly more complex question
of what culture truly entails. From the standpoint of cultural theory, however, the
major developments have come from evolutionary/ecological approaches to cultures as
adaptive systems. The foundations laid by Leslie White have been creatively recast by
such scholars as Sahlins, Rappaport, Vayda, and Harris for instance.iii This is not to
say that a consensus has been met but rather, increasingly, most scholars such as the
exchange between Service (1968), and Harris (1969), Marxist critiques of Harris’
cultural materialism, the gulfs between cultural ecology conceived by Vayda &
Rappaport (1968)... all attest to the diversity and disagreement of the concept of culture.
The broad assumptions that most scholars do agree on, according to Keesing (1974)
are:
“(a) Cultures are systems (of socially transmitted behaviour patterns) that serve to
relate human communities to their ecological settings.
These ways-of-life-of
communities include technologies and modes of social grouping and political
organization, religious beliefs and practices, and so on. When cultures are viewed
broadly as behaviour systems characteristic of populations, extending and permuting
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somatic givens, whether we consider them to be patterns of culture or patterns for
behaviour is a secondary question.”
“Culture is all those things means whose forms are not quite under direct genetic
control which serve to adjust individuals and groups within their ecological
communities.” (Binford, 1968: 323)
“The culture concept comes down to behaviour patterns associated with particular
groups of peoples, that is to ‘customs’ or to peoples’ ‘way of life’ (Harris, 1968: 16)
(b) Cultural change is primarily a process of adaptation and what amounts to natural
selection.
“Man is an animal and, like all other animals, must maintain an adaptive relationship
with his surroundings in order to survive. Although he achieves this adaptation
principally through the medium of culture, the process is guided by the same rules of
natural selection that govern biological adaptation.” (Insert italics mine!) (Meggers,
1971: 4)
[Culture is s]een as adaptive systems, cultures change in the direction of equilibrium
within ecosystems; but when balances are upset by environmental, demographic,
technological, or other systemic changes, further adjustive changes ramify through the
cultural system. Feedback mechanisms in cultural systems may thus operate both
negatively (toward self-correction and equilibrium) and positively (toward
disequilibrium and directional change).
(c) Technology, subsistence economy, and elements of social organization directly tied
to production are the most adaptively central realms of culture. It is in these realms
that adaptive changes usually begin and from which they usually ramify. ... [Harris,
Marxists, Rappaport and Vayda]... would view economies and their social correlates
as in some sense primary, and ideational systems-religion, ritual, world view- as in
some sense secondary, derived epiphenomenal.
“Similar technologies applied to similar environments tend to produce similar
arrangements of labor in production and distribution, and ... these in turn call forth
similar kinds of social groupings, which justify and coordinate their activities by means
of similar systems of values and beliefs.” (Harris, 1968: 4)
(d) The ideational components of cultural systems may have adaptive consequences-in
controlling population, contributing to subsistence, maintaining the ecosystem, etc; and
these, though often subtle, must be carefully traced wherever they lead:
[However,] “...it is necessary to consider the total culture when analyzing adaptation.
Superficially, it might be assumed that attention could be confined to aspects directly
related to the environment... [But] whether analysis begins with religious practices,
social organization, or some other sector of a cultural complex ... [it] will... reveal
functional relationships with other categories of behaviour that are adaptive.”
(Meggers, 1971: 43)
(Keesing, 1974: 75-77)

The above illustrates the similarities and yet the stark contrast between theoretical
approaches to better understanding the notions of culture. Culture in itself embodies
what humanity has achieved through millennia of evolution and natural selection.
However it is Meggers (1971) whom seems confident in linking humanity itself to the
bare truth, that humans are animals. Like most living creatures on this planet, humanity
is by its innate nature a social entity. One which must adhere to natural selection and in
so doing must facilitate its existence by utilizing the very tools nature bestowed unto us,
Issue Number 17, May 2008

Page 71

ITB Journal

primarily language. However, before language can be considered let us first further
examine culture by introducing it not as a recent phenomenon, but rather one that has
existed since the birth of humanity whilst taking into consideration that language in and
of itself is in fact a recent phenomenon. One which only takes into consideration
modern society negating the possibility, if not almost purposefully ignoring that
cultures were not always as sophisticated as Marxists, Harris, or Keesing would have us
believe. Cultures are located in time and space by the temporal and spatial distribution
of the individuals sharing them.iv They exist only in the minds of the people sharing
that culture and although one can not underestimate nor dilute the vast
accomplishments humanity has succeeded in bearing; it too can not go unaccounted for
that, like all animals, we have evolved from a point of existence where culture simply
consisted of a set of ideas and way of life. A way of life that, as we have seen through
primates, are distant echoes of a time when humanity was as vulnerable as those
animals that live under our rule today.
Thus what forms culture can take inevitably depends on the ability of the group and of
the individual to think of, imagine, and learn. As well, an innate ability to be able to
pass this information on to new members either through rearing of children
(enculturation) or assimilation of another group must be accomplished within a
simplistic means of acculturation for the latter. Thus, cultures must be thinkable and
learnable as well as livable in that the ecosystem also plays a role in helping develop
the type of condition and life style that will take place. It is through such adaptationists
theoretical frameworks that one may consider human culture as the ideal, but it can also
be used to explain how animal culture itself exists. However, ideational archetypes
exist about culture, attempting further to distance humans from that inner animal which
seems to cling at our consciousness as we strive to be more than the sum of our
biological parts. Keesing distinguishes three different ways of approaching cultures as
systems of ideas. First, cultures must be seen as a cognitive system. According to
Ward Goodenough (1957):
“Culture is not a material phenomenon; it does not consist of things, people,
behaviour, or emotions. It is rather an organization of these things. It is the form of
things that people have in mind, their models for perceiving, relating, and otherwise
interpreting them.” (167)

Second, are Cultures of Structural systems, where Levi-Strauss views cultures a shared
symbolic systems that are cumulative creations of mind; he seeks to discover in the
structuring of cultural domains- myth, art, kinship, language- the principles, he feels of
the mind that generates cultural elaborations. Thus, the physical world which humans
live within may provide the raw materials necessary to make their visions into a reality,
however, the mind in itself imposes culturally patterned order, “... a logic of binary
contrast, of relations and transformations, on a continuously changing and often random
world.”v A symbolic polarity develops, one between that of Nature vs. Culture. LeviStrauss himself becomes concerned with ‘Culture’ rather than with ‘a culture’:
“...he sees American Indian mythic structures as overlapping, interconnected patterns
that transcend not only cognitive organization of [the] individual ... but in a sense
transcend as well the boundaries of language and custom that divide different
peoples.” (Keesing, 1974: 79)

Third, Keesing introduces Cultures as Symbolic Systems, where Clifford Geertz, like
Levi Strauss, has over time become increasingly systematic. Unlike Strauss, however,
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he finds inspiration for work in the individual in real life settings, such as his work
regarding the cock fight, a funeral, and a sheep theft. According to Keesing:
“[Geertz] ...sees the cognitive view of Goodenough and the ‘new ethnographers’ as
reductionistic and spuriously formalistic. ... symbols and meanings are shared by
social actors- between, not in them; they are public, not private.” (1974: 79)

Thus, cultural systems become ideational while such cultural patterns themselves are
not reified or metaphysical but rather, like rocks and dreams, “they are things of this
world.”vi Geertz himself views his notions of culture as ‘semiotie’- thus, to study
culture is to study shared codes of meaning. Geertz refers to cultures as being like old
cities: or rather, the problem of cultural analysis is as much of determining
independencies as interconnection, gulfs as well as bridges he states. According to
Geertz:
“...The appropriate image, if one must have images, of cultural organization, is either
the spider web nor the pile of sand. It is rather more the octopus, whose tentacles are in
large part separately integrated, neurally quite poorly connected with one another and
with what in the octopus passes for a brain, and yet who nonetheless manages to get
around and preserve himself, ... as a viable, if somewhat ungainly entity.” (1966: 6667)

Thus, Geertz argues that culture in and of itself is best seen as a set of behaviour
patterns, concrete yet complex which include customs, usages, traditions, and habit
clusters, however, they also work as a set of control mechanisms for the governing of
social behaviour amongst individual participants within a given culture. Thus far we
have seen that, amongst many things, culture is a system of knowledge, shaped and
constrained by the way the human brain not only acquires information, but also by the
environment in which a culture must exist. It is also the ways which humans organize
and process the information and create an internal model of reality, albeit only valid
when within their own particular culture. At this elementary definition of culture, it can
be argued than that animals do possess the capabilities of understanding and creating a
system of knowledge and tools to pass on learned information from one generation to
the next. For the purpose of this argument we will examine shortly the social structure
of primates, particularly, chimpanzees. However, first we must take a closer look at the
way culture is transmitted from one generation to the next and what, according to many
theorists makes us superior to animals. Naturally, we are talking about language and
mind.
2. Of Language and Mind
“Speech is a non-instinctive, acquired, ‘cultural function’.” Edward Sapir (1949: 4)

The human mind, it would seem, would be the natural equivalent to the lion’s teeth and
claws, or rather more humbly, the varied stripes of a zebra. Its origins have long been a
popular subject, as some reasonable and other not so reasonable claims have been
proposed: ‘Exclamations become words; sounds in nature were imitated, or people
simply got together and assigned sounds to objects and actions.’ Such wild speculation
on the origins of language inevitably led to a ban imposed in 1866 by the Societe de
Linguistique de Paris against papers on linguistic origins.vii Due to the wealth of
information gathered over the last century on primate brains, the development of
linguistic competence of children, more human fossils that can tentatively be used to
reconstruct what brains and vocal tracts must have been like, and a better understanding
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of early hominid way of life have all given way to new theoretical developments in
answering the question whether or not language determines culture or whether culture
determines language. Nevertheless, language is a tool which allows us to survive in a
world where we have no other means of protection. As Geertz surmises, through trial
and error humanity managed to thrive in the process of natural selection. His approach
to the acquisition of language as a system of communication in order to pass on
information and understanding of the cultural view of the world in which one lives
would fall in adequately with the above notions of culture.
However, it is not until one stumbles upon Noam Chomsky (1968) and Eleanor Ochs
(1998) do we get an understanding of how language during contemporary time helps
not simply to enrich our minds, but that has become the medium necessary to maintain
the industrial world. The mind is a complex web of information, how the mind is
conditioned within any given human culture (initially) can only be acquired via
language. Language, it is argued, is the sole means in which a human acquires culture;
this entails one’s understanding of reality and sets forth a set of grammatical rules that
ensure our ability to properly understand it. It serves a purpose, that is to allow
humanity to maintain its idealized fiction of the world, however it does not serve as a
means of creating culture, but rather, it simply maintains it within human culture. Ochs
surmises that the process of socialization enables us to determine all facets of culturally
social acceptable behaviour. Thus, as we constantly strive to better ourselves as a
species, including our understanding of the physical world around us in relation to how
our minds perceive it, so too then must language be changed and improved upon to
accommodate the needs of the group. One can claim that the concept of ‘mind’ from an
anthropological point of view clearly stipulates that the mind can not function to its full
potential without the use of language, nor can language in and of itself exist without the
mind to put it into practice. Thus, in this sense, the mind utilizes language as a tool
which is embedded in our sub-conscious but can only function through the process of
socialization. Once we have attained the basis for but one single dialect of language, the
mind than becomes capable of learning other languages, inevitably aiding humanity’s
efforts to continue perceiving the world through various views whilst still enriching the
individual’s own understanding of how our own minds function in relation to the world
around us.
Nevertheless, the debate between Ochs’ and Chomsky’s two contrasting positions
regarding the acquisition of language can perhaps be placed into two categories; that of
‘innateism vs. socialization.’ Ochs’ own view discusses further the process in which
children must learn a language as governed by their respective culture via a process that
is relational to their own environment. She gives an example using the Samoan
discourse of language acquisition. In it she discusses how Samoan children learn their
language in context to their setting (i.e. Front of house, back of house & side of house)
and relationship with the individual the child is communicating with, (i.e. doctorpatient, student-teacher, child-child, etc.). Caregivers encourage children to use only
‘good language’ (Written Samoan) as opposed to ‘bad language’ (Slang-Non-Written
Samoan).viii In doing so, children learn their language in contrast to their environment.
Thus, it can be argued that the process of acquiring language is situational and can not
be undertaken without the condition(s) of a group’s environment. In such an instance,
both language increases the awareness of their mind and environment while the reverse
takes place as well.
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However, according to Noam Chomsky, the acquisition of language can be understood
as an innate ability that human kind possesses. His work, a reflection of how language
contributes to the environment of our mind, indicates that there is no concrete proof that
human language is not already part of our innate abilities as a species. He states that
though humanity requires at any age to be taught the rudimentary elements of their
respective language, humanity nevertheless have within us a working knowledge, albeit
sub-consciously, of what language is and how it functions.ix Both Chomsky and Ochs
attempt to show that language is in itself the building blocks of how we understand and
perceive not only the world in which we reside, but each other and, as well, ourselves.
Their two different approaches compliment each other in that Chomsky’s view of
humanity having an innate ability to understand language coincides with Ochs’ theory
of socialization. Combined, these two theoretical approaches to the acquisition of
language also allow us to better understand humanity’s ability to distinguish between
the many facets of language, such as meta-communicative markings, symbols and
signs.
This innate ability to be able to speak is what many social theorists claim as the driving
force behind humanity’s success. Geertz (1973) adds to this notion by surmising that
an evolutionary approach must be undertaken and discusses the process of acquisition
of language through the necessity to communicate information from generation to
generation.x Chomsky elaborates on this innate ability by discussing how human
language itself is shared by all humans, a sense of a priori knowledge and psychic unity,
if you will, and is in essence not merely unique to only human kind, however just as
importantly it is vital to our survival as a species; a claim that echoes the Sapir-Whorf
Hypothesis: The view/belief that language determines the way in which we perceive the
world around us. These two views are as follows- the weak view, where language is
viewed as an influence on thought itself vs. the strong view, where thought is
determined solely by language.xi This notion was studied indepthly by John Lucy
(1972) who surmised further that in contemporary theoretical approaches today the
view tends to hold that both language and thought (mind) must work together in
relation to understanding and expanding on one another. Jurgen Habermas (1988)
implements this approach developing a theory of social order in which he postulates the
existence of a background of universal, pereflexive, unthematic knowledge called the
Lifeworld. This ‘Lifeworld’ is manifested through a specific type of speech act called
communicative action. Communicative action enables access to the ‘binding and
bonding of energies of language’ and is composed of structural constraints that together
create an internal connection between meaning and validity.xii
This pragmatic and non-semantic theory of meaning draws on Speech-Act theory and
represents an epistemic turn in truth conditions as it goes beyond the linguistic
utterance for validation while still recognizing the subjective positions of both, the
speaker and hearer. Participants in a communicative act are able to “connect up” view
his notion of the Lifeworld. Habermas extends his communicative theory to a theory of
social action, to explain how social order is possible. In his view, society is woven
from webs of linguistically mediated interactions that draw upon the unethematic
knowledge of the Lifeworld, and, through communicative acts, shape this knowledge
into cultural paradigms, legitimate orders, and personality structures. Habermas sees
these as the three interrelated and interdependent components of the Lifeworld. They
reciprocally interact through communicative action with the Lifeworld, creating the
possibility for social cohesion. Although Habermas proposes a theory that looks beyond
the structural components of language to see how communicative action makes social
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cohesion possible, in doing so, he places the power of language not as an entity in and
of itself, as has been done many times before him (i.e. Chomsky) but as a tool used by
people. Indeed, the idea that two humans can connect in a communicative way so as to
reach an understanding about the world must be the basis for cultural development, but
the ways in which such a process is made possible has seemed to be often taken for
granted.
3. Conclusion
These approaches work well in formulating and determining the nature and function of
language in human culture, as Geertz (1973) continues to stipulate that the mind
functions in processing and identifying information through a “concept that denotes a
class of skills, propensities, capacities, tendencies, and habits.” (47-48). This is
achieved through primary and secondary cognition where substitution, reversal, and
condensation are but a few aspects of the mind that come prior to directed, logically
ordered, a human’s capability to reason. He examines the growth potential of this
ability through the evolution of the human species by both biological and social means
of interpretation. Based on a biological perspective, the human brain in and of itself is
three times larger than our ancestors. It is through a social outlook, however, that one
can determine the growth of social behaviour by the stimulus deficit and stimulus
discovery. The first refers to an innate sense of curiosity that needs to be fulfilled
whilst the latter is the satisfaction of our curiosity through trial and error. It is through
motivational problems, Geertz asserts, that culture and language evolve, a process
linked directly to the notion of psychic unity where all human cultures share the same
patterns of evolution but during different periods in time depending on such
circumstances as environment. However, though the above illustrates the purpose of
the advancement of language, rather than of its origins and though it can be said that it
allows any rational, intelligible person to derive the same conclusions when serious
thought is given to the origins, nature and function of culture and language, it does not
however answer the question clearly and concisely as to whether or not language is
truly innate or not? Thus, let us turn our attention to the notion that language itself
merely defines what it is that a person or an animal feels. That language as a tool can
only strive to better itself in defining the complex emotions and thoughts that humans
sense. According to Edward Sapir (1949):
“…there are only organs that are incidentally useful in the production of speech
sounds. … Physiologically speech is an overlaid function, or, to be more precise, a
group of overlaid functions. It gets what service it can out of organs and functions,
nervous and muscular that have come into being and are maintained for very different
ends of their own. … Language is a purely human and non-instinctive (italics mine)
method of communicating ideas, emotions, desires by means of a system of voluntarily
produced symbols. These symbols are, in the first instance, auditory … much
instinctive expressions and the natural environment may serve as a stimulus for the
development of certain elements of speech, however, much instinctive tendencies, motor
and other, may give a predetermined range or mold to linguistic expression. Such
human or animal communication (italics mine) … as is brought about by involuntary,
instinctive cries is not, in our sense, language at all.” (8-9)

Despite his claim that an utterance or the vocal sound of pain or joy does not, as such,
constitute language or a symbolic meaning, it does however; serve as a more or less
automatic over flow of our emotional energy. Rather, sound imitative words do not
directly derive out of nature but instead are suggested, played with, hence the
onomatopoetic theory of the origin of speech, the theory that would explain all speech
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as a gradual evolution from sounds of an imitative character, really brings us no closer,
according to Sapir, to the instinctive level than is language as we know it today.xiii Still
questions persist, ‘Can thought be possible without speech?’ If so, do primates not
regularly utilize thought processes and judgments to maintain social cohesion, or to
begin a war with neighboring groups? Does not the Feral Child think without the
concept of language as understood and defined by contemporary humanity? Questions
that will continue to persist as anthropologists continue to explore other forms of
communication other than language. Thus, language itself can be argued to be as
limiting as it has been progressive for the human mind and has given us both our
concepts of sameness and differences between us and ‘the other.’
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